DEM Party’s impact on local elections: Candidates, trustees and vote shares
İSTANBUL & URFA — As Turkey prepares for local elections in less than two weeks, all eyes are on the “Kurdish vote,” which is often defined as Turkey’s “swing vote”.
This is particularly the case in this year’s İstanbul race. Many discussions in the pre-election period focused on whether the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) would field its own candidates or form an alliance with other parties.
DEM Party – Turkey’s third-largest party in parliament – eventually chose to field its own candidates many cities for the March 31 elections, and the decision can potentially tilt election outcomes across the nation. But tilt in whose favor?
Experts and party officials told Turkey recap that DEM’s electoral strategy may benefit different parties in different races, with some predicting the pro-Kurdish party’s approach may lead to a decline in its own vote share.
Voter redirection
In the 2019 local elections, DEM’s predecessor – the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – did not field candidates in most western cities and instead supported candidates for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
Similarly, in the 2023 presidential elections, DEM’s more recent predecessor – the Green Left Party (YSP) – rallied votes for the opposition presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
This year, DEM chose not to direct its voters elsewhere. Vahap Coşkun, a member of the Diyarbakır Political and Social Research Institute (DİSA) and an academic at Dicle University’s Faculty of Law, said the strategy change came from the party’s concerns about appealing to larger voter blocs beyond its core base.
Coşkun characterized the 2019 and 2023 voter redirections as “a significant issue impacting both the party’s perception and representation.”
“DEM secured the victory for the opposition in 2019, but what did the opposition do [in return]?” Coşkun asked.
“Did they improve their relations with the DEM Party or contribute to the solution of the Kurdish issue? No [they didn’t],” he said, defining the redirection strategy as a loss for the party after it did not benefit from allying with the opposition bloc.
“This is why they have opted to run in the elections with their own candidates,” Coşkun added.
He also cited infighting between DEM factions – over whether or not to field candidates – as the reason behind the party’s decision to avoid fielding more prominent, symbolic figures in certain provinces like İstanbul.
With the resulting scenario and current candidate pool, Coşkun argued DEM’s vote share could possibly decline in the March 31 elections.
The aim of winning
Although DEM officials said the decision to field candidates in every province stemmed from the party’s own inclinations and evaluations, CHP Chair Özgür Özel alleged DEM had engaged in “various negotiations, particularly concerning the [state-appointed] trustee issue,” with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Citing the alleged negotiations, Özel then asserted DEM was pursuing a strategy aimed at “making the CHP lose.”
DEM Party Deputy Group Chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit refuted the claim, telling Turkey recap that party policies for the local elections did not aim to ensure any other party’s victory or defeat.
“We have no interest in currying favor with anyone,” Koçyiğit said.
“If that were the case, we would have declared it publicly as we did in 2019,” she continued, recalling the HDP had pursued a strategy that caused the AKP to lose in some major cities that year.
“If we had a policy of aligning with either the AKP or CHP today, we would clearly articulate it,” Koçyiğit added.
Meral Danış Beştaş, DEM Party’s İstanbul mayoral candidate, also pushed back on speculation over the party’s alleged negotiations with the AKP.
“We find these discussions very unfortunate,” Beştaş told Turkey recap.
According to Beştaş, the HDP’s decision not to field a candidate in İstanbul in 2019 aimed to “demonstrate their key role and influence, as well as to pave the way for democratization and to change the existing polarization.”
She said the party had succeeded in those objectives.
“But this shouldn’t cast doubt on the fact DEM Party has a presence throughout Turkey,” Beştaş added. “The crucial point is for the parties themselves to participate in the elections and connect with their supporters.”
The Demirtaş question
After its primaries in January, DEM finalized its candidate list for the 2024 elections in eastern and southeastern Turkey. However, the announcement of candidates in western provinces took much longer.
The city that garnered the most attention for its candidate selection process was İstanbul, where DEM secured 8 percent of the votes in the 2023 parliamentary elections, when it ran as YSP.
That year, former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş participated in the candidate nomination process for İstanbul from his prison cell in Edirne, where he has been held for more than seven years.
In the lead up to the 2024 elections, one potentially prominent DEM candidate for İstanbul was thought to be Başak Demirtaş, the wife of the incarcerated politician.
Başak Demirtaş said at the end of January that she was open to being the İstanbul candidate “if the people want it and our party deems it appropriate”, but she soon after withdrew her candidacy as a result of party negotiations.
Following the developments, DEM nominated Meral Danış Beştaş and Murat Çepni as co-candidates for İstanbul.
Roj Girasun, director of the Diyarbakır-based Rawest research center, told Turkey recap in February that although the pair are strong candidates, they would fail to generate the same level of excitement as Başak Demirtaş. Girasun suggested the choice might lead to a loss of votes for DEM.
“İstanbul holds significant importance for DEM Party, and it is experiencing a decline in support there,” Coşkun said, echoing sentiments that the decision not to field Demirtaş could harm DEM’s election performance.
“There was a need for a candidate who could halt the decline, galvanize the DEM Party base, and elevate this downward trajectory,” he added. “Başak Demirtaş could have been a symbolic figure in this regard.”
As a result, Coşkun said some DEM voters may not go to the polls – especially in İstanbul – or may vote for Ekrem İmamoğlu, the incumbent mayor and CHP candidate, which could also significantly decrease DEM’s vote share.
“If DEM Party receives significantly fewer votes in İstanbul compared to previous elections, it would also signal a problem for the future,” he said.
The leading figures in the İstanbul race are CHP’s İmamoğlu and AKP candidate Murat Kurum. While most polls show a slight lead for İmamoğlu, experts told Turkey recap that a low DEM voter turnout would increase İmamoğlu’s prospects. In contrast, a high DEM turnout would benefit Kurum.
Trustee trump card
The 2024 elections take place as DEM voters also question whether the party’s candidates will be allowed to keep the municipalities that they win.
Since 2016, the Turkish government has replaced elected mayors in eastern and southeastern municipalities with state-appointed trustees and it continued this practice after the 2019 local elections.
In the process, officials in nearly 100 municipalities were removed from their positions after their election, with charges often linking previously eligible candidates to terrorism activities.
According to the Regional Political Trends Survey conducted by Rawest Research in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa and Van in 2021, more than 80 percent of residents in those provinces considered the state-appointed trustee practice to be “wrong.”
“From our perspective, the trustee system is obsolete, defunct and already bankrupt,” Beştaş told Turkey recap.
In a speech in December, the nationalist İYİ Party Chair Meral Akşener also criticized the AKP government, stating: “In this election, abandon the shrewd tactic of permitting terror sympathizers to stand for office initially and replacing them with your trustees only after their election into the office, as you have done in previous years.”
Akşener argued the AKP had used trustee appointments as a trump card to engage in clandestine negotiations with DEM.
“If you are sincere, cease secret negotiations about the trustee issue,” she said.
Reflecting again on the negotiation allegations, DEM Deputy Group Deputy Chairman Koçyiğit said the real issue was the broad societal perception that DEM can’t hold discussions with any party or engage in democratic party politics.
“There have been speculations that we were going to strike a deal with the AKP in the past, and we have often encountered similar situations,” Koçyiğit said.
Damla Uğantaş and Gonca Tokyol edited this article and contributed additional reporting from İstanbul. Oğul Köseoğlu translated this article from Turkish.
This newsletter is supported by readers via Substack and Patreon. Paid subscribers get full access to our recaps, reports, members-only Slack and more. We also have pun-tastic merch. All proceeds go towards sustaining our journalism.
Turkey recap is an independent news platform produced by the Kolektif Medya Derneği, an İstanbul-based non-profit association founded by our editorial team to support and elevate news media and journalists in Turkey.
Get in touch: send pitches, queries and feedback to info@turkeyrecap.com.
Diego Cupolo, Editor-in-chief @diegocupolo
Gonca Tokyol, Editor-at-large @goncatokyol
Ingrid Woudwijk, Managing editor @deingrid
Verda Uyar, Digital growth manager @verdauyar
Sema Beşevli, Editorial intern @ssemab_
Onur Hasip, Editorial intern @onurhasip
 | A guest post by
|